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This paper evaluates energy tax reform in the Netherlands between 1988 and 2002 from 
a climate change perspective. A tax on fuels and the so-called regulatory energy tax 
since 1996 are examples of indirect and non-uniform taxation of emissions. The overall 
tax base and rate structure corroborates recent theoretical findings that heterogeneity in 
production processes and transaction costs may justify optimal departures from the 
Pigovian corrective tax rule. Surprisingly, the Dutch revenue-raising tax matches the 
(modified) Pigovian policy prescription rather well, whereas the regulatory energy tax 
mainly follows the revenue raising Ramsey logic. Further improvements of the energy 
tax structure are also discussed, such as targeting the energy tax base and linking the tax 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom has it that environmental taxes are – at best – of limited importance in 
pollution policy. Recent evidence, however, suggests that green tax reforms have changed this 
picture in many OECD countries (Ekins and Speck, 1999; Stavins, 2002; Barde and Braathen, 
2003). One particular area for reform has been the use of the tax system to provide proper 
incentives to reduce climate change emissions. Indeed, the burning of fossil-fuel-based energy 
products contributes significantly to climate-change-related emissions, and current green tax 
reforms are usually motivated by this externality. Several countries, such as the Scandinavian 
countries, Austria and the Netherlands, have introduced new energy taxes or modified 
existing tax systems. These initiatives reflect the extensive policy discussion in the European 
Union (EU) and even in the US at the beginning of the 1990s, although neither the EU nor the 
US decided to introduce climate change taxes. 
This paper focuses on one country in particular, the Netherlands. In the last decade, 
several tax policy initiatives caused a major shift in the way in which energy products are 
treated. The tax burden as well as the tax base of the existing fuel tax changed considerably 
between 1988 and 1992, and even an explicit hybrid carbon/energy tax was introduced in 
1996. Furthermore, this tax is combined with specific incentives to stimulate investments in 
non-fossil-fuel-based energy technologies, such as biomass, solar and wind power, and its 
revenue is used to lower other taxes.  
At face value, the Dutch reform appears suboptimal from the traditional regulatory 
perspective. According to the Pigovian view, efficient taxes on so-called ‘large number’ 
externalities should be direct and uniform, i.e. a uniform rate on the emission itself (Baumol 
and Oates, 1988). Energy taxes, however, are examples of the indirect taxation of emissions. 
Moreover, as will be explained in further detail later, these taxes are not uniform in the Dutch 
case. This raises the important question of how to judge this green tax reform. Does the  4
reform provide the right incentives to curb climate change emissions? Or is it a relatively 
distorting way to raise revenue, given that at least part of the tax revenue is raised on 
intermediate goods?  
The benchmark for the traditional view is a government that chooses efficient taxes to 
internalize externalities (for homogeneous agents) in economies with full information. 
However, recent theoretical developments suggest that indirect and even non-uniform taxes, 
such as energy taxes with exemptions, can be efficient instruments in a second-best 
environment (see: Bovenberg and Goulder, 2001; Fullerton, Hong and Metcalf, 2001; Cremer 
and Gahvari, 2001; Smulders and Vollebergh, 2001). With a revenue-raising government or 
(endogenous) transaction costs included, the choice of an optimal energy tax structure has to 
reflect appropriate (indirect) incentives for emission reduction and weigh also the role of these 
taxes as a revenue-raising instrument. In fact, the choice of the optimal regulatory tax base is 
an essential ingredient of the policy of the government. The main lesson from this literature is 
that environmental tax policy evaluation should not only look for explicit taxes on emissions 
or their statutory rates, but also evaluate the effective emission tax burden across products and 
its uses, sectors and agents from both a regulatory and a revenue-raising perspective. To 
provide such an evaluation is the main purpose of this paper. 
My major concern is the choice of the energy tax base and rate structure to lower the 
levels of climate change emissions, in particular CO2 emissions, due to the use of energy 
products (oil, gas, coal, electricity) as an (intermediate) input. Therefore the focus of this 
evaluation is the use of energy for heating purposes (including power generation), and not for 
combustion in transport (see Fullerton and West, 2002). Careful examination of the optimal 
energy tax structure in this case reveals the importance of heterogeneity in production 
processes using energy as a heating fuel (Smulders and Vollebergh, 2001). Sectors differ not 
only in their energy elasticities but also in their input–emission linkage. For instance, if  5
sectors use residual gases, input taxation is likely to exacerbate emissions. Furthermore, 
energy is an intermediate input produced by upstream sectors, which introduces the choice as 
to where it is optimal to levy the indirect tax. Finally, sectors may also differ as to how costly 
it is to implement (additional) tax. Consequently, non-uniform input taxes including 
exemptions can be efficient from the regulatory perspective. Also higher energy taxes on 
households may add to Ramsey considerations in raising energy tax revenue with lowest 
distortions. 
Interestingly, much of the current rationale of the Dutch energy tax structure follows 
from a sometimes even accidental recognition of this heterogeneity. For instance, the current  
Fuel Tax (FT) does exempt residual gases. This exemption is optimal from the regulatory 
perspective, as will be explained later in detail, but its existence is only due to a ruling of the 
Dutch Supreme Court on completely different grounds. Similarly, the newly introduced 
regulatory energy tax (RET) signals green tax reform because of its high amount of revenue 
raised on a ‘green’ tax base, i.e. energy use by households and small firms. However, 
although the RET is (relatively) efficient from a Ramsey perspective, a simple increase in the 
tax rates of the existing tax on fuels would probably have been better from a regulatory 
perspective. Thus the revenue-raising tax on energy accommodates important exemptions 
from the regulatory perspective, whereas the regulatory tax mainly taxes relatively inelastic 
uses of (fossil-fuel) energy. This just illustrates that higher tax revenues from energy tax bases 
may not always signal Pareto improvements, even if one restricts the evaluation to the 
environmental dividend alone.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section shows why the changes in 
the energy tax structure in the Netherlands are a clear example of green tax reform. Next, 
section 3 discusses the energy tax structure in more detail. Section 4 presents criteria for  6
evaluation based on recent theoretical work in optimal corrective tax theory. Section 5 
evaluates and section 6 concludes. 
Finally, some limitations of this evaluation should be mentioned. First, I simply take 
the policy objective of the Dutch government for granted, i.e. the Netherlands aims to reduce 
climate change emissions by means of energy taxes. Therefore, interaction with other policy 
goals, such as other environmental problems or congestion, is not discussed.
1 The same 
applies to the interaction with other environmental policy instruments. Finally, the reader 
interested in the effectiveness of the energy tax structure reform should consult other sources.
2 
 
2. TAXING ENERGY PRODUCTS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
This section presents the energy tax structure in the Netherlands in detail. It shows that the 
change in the tax treatment of different energy products meets the two major conditions for 
green tax reform. First, the taxation of ‘polluting’ energy products raises more revenue on all 
measures than ever before. Second, major shifts can be observed in its incentive structure: not 
only is the consumption of more energy products subject to tax, but also the tax rates are now 
more closely linked to differences in pollution characteristics across these products.  
 
Revenue aspects  
Taxation as a means of creating direct incentives to reduce the climate change impacts of 
energy products has a long history, albeit its revenue-raising impact has always been modest. 
Although the origin of the FT dates back to charges introduced in the early 1970s, when the 
                                                 
1 Climate change emissions are, of course, only a subset of externalities related to the burning of fossil fuels. 
Ideally, green tax reform should take account of the cost of the whole vector of emissions and their shadow 
prices including the ‘green’ energy product substitutes, such as biomass, wind and solar power. Viscusi et al. 
(1994), for instance, estimate the social cost of different energy products related to smog, damage to the ozone 
layer and acid rain. See Newbery (2003) for a discussion on the interaction of corrective taxes with multiple 
externalities, in particular congestion.  7
revenues were used to finance government outlays for combating pollution, reducing climate 
change impacts as a reason to tax energy products dates back to the end of the 1980s. As in 
most European countries, energy taxes predominantly piggybacked on existing excises on 
mineral oils (mainly motor fuels), and only a few very small taxes on coal and uranium were 
added. In 1988, excises on mineral oils and the FT together were responsible for 4% of total 
tax revenue in the Netherlands (see Table 1). [INSERT TABLE 1] The FT and an inventory 
tax on oil products contributed rather little to these revenues.  
Since 1988, the relative importance of energy taxes has increased considerably. First, 
the FT became more important as a revenue-raising instrument. This tax has grown out of a 
set of small charges with a rather complicated tax base for financing purposes (including air 
pollution and noise).
3 After these charges were transformed into a transparent tax on fuels in 
1988, their rates were raised substantially at the beginning of the 1990s. Second, the Dutch 
government introduced a completely new tax in 1996 to regulate energy consumption and 
reduce CO2 emissions. This tax, the RET, has been introduced despite the failure of the 
European Commission to introduce an EU-wide carbon tax.  
As a result, the role of the mineral oil excise (MOE) has declined from almost 100% 
of overall energy tax revenue in 1988 to only 66% in 2002. Together, all energy taxes 
accounted for 8.8% of total tax revenue in 2002. Even though the total tax burden (excluding 
social security contributions) of the entire Dutch economy fell from 26.3% in 1990 to 23.6% 
in 2001, tax revenue from energy products has almost doubled as a share of GDP. Not 
surprisingly, it is now more important both as a share of overall tax receipts and as a share of 
the indirect tax burden (including value added tax or VAT). The major tax reform in 2001 
reinforces this trend. Aside from a revision in the income tax, the government has raised the 
tax rates of the RET and the VAT further (from 17.5% to 19%).  
                                                                                                                                                          
2 For instance, Linderhof (2002) finds clear evidence from household microdata that residential use of gas and 
electricity is affected by the energy tax reform.   8
 
Tax bases and rates 
The shift in the tax treatment of energy products underlying the rise in revenue excluding 
VAT is illustrated in detail in Table 2. [INSERT TABLE 2] The table not only reveals large 
differences in the current treatment of energy products by the different energy taxes, but also 
shows how the newly introduced taxes, in particular the FT and the RET, broaden the tax 
base. These taxes are responsible for the inclusion of energy products such as coal, natural gas 
and (small-scale consumption of) electricity as well as mineral oils used for heating purposes. 
In particular, the RET is responsible for from over 50% to 100% of the excise burden of some 
products. Note also that large differences exist between tax rates on energy products used as 
motor fuels, heating fuel, feedstock or for other applications. In general, MOE tax rates are 
highest for gasoline and lowest for mineral oils used for heating purposes. All excises are 
specific per unit of energy volume. The FT has had a hybrid tax base since 1990. Initially, a 
fixed CO2 component was added to the initial tax base by energy content. Since 1992, the 
different fuels have been (more or less) taxed according to their relative energy and carbon 
content, each counting for 50% in the overall tax base. 
Initially, the RET taxed energy products used for heating purposes (mainly gas in the 
Netherlands) or power generation (electricity) by small-scale consumers, like households and 
small firms. However, the tax base has been broadened since the RET’s introduction in 1996 
and now also includes consumption by intermediate firms. Tax rates are degressive with the 
level of consumption for each connection to the grid, and very large electricity consumption 
levels face a zero rate. All products are also taxed according to the normal VAT rate.  
Together, these taxes create the incentive structure on energy products used for 
heating or power generation. Note, first of all, that mineral oils not used as motor fuels are 
                                                                                                                                                          
3 Later, other tax bases were introduced, such as a tax on groundwater extraction, water and landfills.   9
subject to all the taxes. The much lower MOE on mineral oils used as heating fuel is 
compensated partly by the RET. Crude oil is only taxed indirectly, i.e. downstream after the 
refinery process, by the taxation of refined mineral oils (gasoline, etc.). Accordingly, the 
energy consumed (and emissions caused) by refining is excluded from the tax base, as are 
particular refinery products, such as petrocokes and liquid and gaseous residuals, which are 
often recycled in the same plant. 
The Netherlands is one of the few countries that taxes and not subsidizes coal, 
although still at a low rate (coal mines were closed at the end of the 1960s). Interestingly, 
(large) consumers may opt for different calculations of the tax base for the FT, either a fixed 
amount per tonne or a fixed amount per GJ and per unit carbon. The latter option is profitable 
for consumers using coal categories with quality characteristics different from the category on 
which the fixed amount per tonne is based. Note also that special provisions exist for typical 
energy products produced and recycled in production processes based on coal, such as steel 
production. For instance, there are exemptions for blast-furnace and coke-oven gas, if 
recycled within a particular (large) plant. Only if these products are traded does the tax apply. 
Consumption of natural gas (NG) is taxed through the FT, although the tax rate for 
large-scale consumption is very low. The degressive tax rates of the RET, however, are much 
stronger, with even no tax applying to large-scale NG consumption. Also, an exemption 
existed for consumption up to 800m
3 between 1996 and 2001, but this has recently been 
changed into a tax credit with equal value in terms of income loss (Euro 142). Finally, 
reduced tax rates apply to gas consumed for horticulture. 
The consumption of electricity is, like the consumption of NG, taxed through the RET, 
including also a degressive rate structure and an exemption for very large consumers. Note 
that NG input for electricity production is exempted from the RET, and all inputs have been 
exempted from the FT since 2001. Electricity producers originally also had to pay FT for the  10
use of fuels, such as coal and NG, and a uranium tax was due for nuclear power generation 
between 1997 and 2001. In 2001, this regime was changed in favor of what is called an 
‘output’ tax. Now, all fuels used for electricity generation are exempted, including the fuels 
used in combined heat and power (CHP) plants (with electric efficiency over 30%). 
Simultaneously, the tax rates on electricity were raised under the RET regime. 
Specific provisions existed for flue gas desulfurization in the FT between 1988 and 
1995. In particular, Euro 1 per tonne of heavy fuel oil or coal could be refunded if these fuels 
were used in combustion plants from which the fuel gases did not contain more than 400mg 
SO2/m
3 and if at least 85% flue gas desulfurization was applied. Finally, several energy 
products were originally exempted from these energy taxes, like consumption and production 
of electricity from biomass, wind and solar power. Since January 2003 these products are 
taxed at a reduced rate. Methane is still subject to zero-rate MOE.  
The revenue raised by these taxes is also treated differently by source. Both the MOE 
and the FT are traditional revenue-raising instruments. However, specific provisions exist for 
the RET because this tax was introduced as part of a (balanced-budget) green tax reform. 
Both industry and households have been compensated by lower income and corporate tax 
rates as well as employers’ social security contributions. Part of the revenue raised by the 
RET is spent on subsidies that aim to improve energy efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions. In 
particular, (decentralized) subsidies exist for the generation of electricity using biomass, wind, 
solar power and CHP by producers, as well as for insulation and energy-efficient products 
bought by households.  
Summarizing, the Netherlands clearly experiments with green tax reform: by all 
measures, direct taxation of energy products has become more important over the last decade. 
Overall, energy taxes are responsible for 59% of the revenue raised by environmentally  11
related taxes.
4 Furthermore, energy tax reforms in the Netherlands over the last decade reflect 
an interesting broadening and reform of the energy tax base (and rates), even though several 
exemptions have been introduced. 
3. ENERGY TAX STRUCTURE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
The current energy tax structure in the Netherlands reveals that different energy taxes affect 
different energy products differently. Some products are subject to all three energy taxes, 
while others are taxed only through one tax. Also, the tax bases of the different taxes vary 
with price and energy product characteristics, such as energy or carbon content. Finally, the 
different energy taxes are often not uniform, i.e. taxation of the products also depends on 
which agent consumes the product. 
Table 3 specifies how two energy products, light fuel oil and natural gas, are affected 
by the various energy taxes and including also VAT. According to Dutch tax law, the overall 
tax on light fuel oil (LFO) comprises three elements: 
•  a specific excise at a rate of Euro 47 per 1,000 liter according to the MOE Act; 
•  a specific FT and the RET at rates of Euro 14 and Euro 132 per 1000 liter, but levied 
according to the fuel’s energy and carbon content on a 50/50 basis relative to crude oil for 
the FT and relative to natural gas for the RET; 
•  VAT at an ad valorem rate of 19% on the net retail price plus all specific taxes. 
The tax structure of natural gas (NG) consumed by households is as follows: 
•  a specific excise, based on both the FT and the RET, at an overall rate of Euro 135 per 
1000m
3, and levied according to the fuel’s energy and carbon content on a 50/50 basis; 
•  VAT at an ad valorem rate of 19% on the net retail price plus all specific taxes.  
                                                 
4 In 2000, total environmentally related tax revenue (including a tax on groundwater extraction, water use and 
landfills and taxes on the purchase, possession and use of cars) amounted to Euro 13.8 bln.  12
The problem with this (common) representation of the energy tax structure is its poor 
informative content with respect to its (regulatory) incentives. Volume of the fuels is a poor 
indicator of the relative performance of energy products for heating purposes. Although an 
increase in the tax rate per unit of volume always induces agents to look for cheaper 
alternatives, the impact of a similar rise in tax differs across products due to differences in, for 
instance, heating potential. To account for such differences across goods characteristics, Table 
3 presents a standardized decomposition of energy taxes per GJ. [INSERT TABLE 3] The 
table illustrates the importance of standardization of the tax base for the evaluation of the tax 
impact. One immediate observation, for instance, is that the apparently higher total excise tax 
on LFO than on NG is much smaller after normalization. The relative difference declines 
from 1.47 (198/135 in Table 2) to 1.28 (5.49/4.27 in Table 3). 
Furthermore, the linkage between emissions and input use varies across products, even 
for a standardized representation of inputs in GJ. For instance, LFO is more pollution-
intensive per unit of (standardized) fuel than is NG. The relevance of such quality differences 
across products are well known and usually call for a well-targeted choice of the tax base. 
Indeed, the choice of quality between energy products is an important dimension of the 
regulatory incentive provided by the choice of the tax base. This is typically translated, in the 
climate change context, into taxes that should differ across energy products according to the 
carbon content of these products.  
Finally, even for one and the same product the choice of the tax base and rate is a 
delicate issue. An energy product can be mutable or it might be produced under conditions of 
imperfect competition. If so, the choice between ad valorem and specific rates for one and the 
same energy product matters.
5 Energy markets are typically not known for their competitive 
                                                 
5  See Keen (1998) for a discussion of why the equivalence theorem of ad valorem and specific taxes no longer 
holds under mutability and imperfect competition.  
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character (although this might change in the next decade). More interestingly for our purpose, 
the quality of one and the same product is a choice variable as well. Even though (the 
production of) energy products face(s) typical technical limitations due to materials balance 
constraints, even goods characteristics of an energy product are mutable. Examples include 
gasoline such as Pura from Shell, but also variants of coal with much lower sulfur content. 
Indeed, the linkage between specific product characteristics and their associated emissions is 
particularly important for the choice between different regulatory tax types. 
To account for differences in goods characteristics and net-of-tax prices across energy 
products, it is useful to introduce some tax ratios using the previous example: 
•  First, the total (effective) tax burden T is equal to the ratio of the sum of all taxes to the 
gross retail price, or T = [ts + ta(pn+ts)]/p. For LFO, this ratio reads Euro 8.22 (the sum of 
all taxes) to Euro 17.09 (the gross retail price), which is 0.48 or 48%; for NG, it is 0.47 or 
47%. Thus the difference in retail price between LFO and NG is only slightly enlarged by 
differences in the tax system. 
•  Second, the overall share S is the share of specific excises in total tax, or S = ts/[ts + 
ta(pn+ts)], which is 67% for LFO and 66% for NG. Apparently the share is almost identical 
for the two products even though their net retail prices differ considerably and only LFO 
is subject to the MOE. Thus the higher absolute amount of specific excise for LFO does 
not change the relative price differential excluding taxes. Note, however, that specific 
excises have a different impact, even if no retail price differences exist, due to differences 
in characteristics of the energy products (such as energy or carbon content). Because not 
all characteristics of the products are taxed, selective taxation induces a shift towards 
untaxed elements, causing a so-called upgrading effect (Keen, 1998, p. 6). Firms may 
choose to alter the characteristic composition, or the market equilibrium between different 
variants of the same product (with ‘fixed quality’) is affected.  14
•  Third, the linkage share L is the share of specific excises with a particular emissions-
related tax base in the total amount of specific excise, which is 39% for LFO and 46% for 
NG for the carbon tax base.
6 One would have expected a higher share for LFO because 
LFO contains more carbon per unit of (useful) fuel than NG. The reason for this anomaly 
is an allowance provided by the Dutch government for LFO since the rise in the RET tax 
rate in 1999 (see below).
7 Finally, note that the linkage share reflects one specific aspect 
of the upgrading effect – how much of the specific excises is directly linked to 
environmental characteristics (one in this case). The measure is particularly useful for 
products used as inputs in production or final consumption, such as energy products. The 
higher this share, the more targeted is the environmental incentive. 
•  Fourth, the multiplier M is the ratio of the gross retail price to this retail price excluding 
ad valorem taxes, or M = 1/(1–ta). Both LFO and NG are only taxed through the standard 
VAT rate of 19% of the net retail price plus specific excises. Accordingly, M is entirely 
similar for LFO and NG.
8  
The overall picture is that the absolute tax burden is considerable, with specific excises 
being responsible for almost half of the gross retail price. Interestingly, the higher 
(standardized) absolute tax burden for LFO than for NG is modest though significant in terms 
of relative prices. The net relative retail price differential between LFO and NG per GJ is 
1.19, whereas the overall tax differential raises the gross price differential to 1.23. This rise is 
only due to differences in specific taxes, in particular LFO being subject to the MOE whereas 
                                                 
6 Calculations reflect the CO2 component in the specific tax base based on emission factors of fuels used by the 
Dutch Ministry of Finance in 1997 (see Vermeend and Van der Vaart, 1997). Available on request. 
7 The calculation above is based on the assumption that the allowance is distributed equally over both underlying 
tax bases. If the hybrid tax base applied across the board, L would typically be 46% for LFO. Also for the FT 
and RET alone, i.e. excluding the role of the MOE, the linkage share rises only to 47% for LFO. 
8 The multiplier reveals that firms must increase the price charged to the consumer by more than Euro 1, i.e. 
Euro 1/(1–ta), in order to increase their net price by Euro 1. Part of any increase in the consumer price goes to the 
government as tax revenue, and this creates a disincentive for costly improvements in product quality (see Keen, 
1998, p. 5). Because no ad valorem taxes other than VAT are applied to energy products, M is typically similar 
for all products. Note also that VAT does not have a direct impact on firms’ input decisions in a  competitive 
market because they are able to shift their tax burden fully forward to the next stage of production.   15
NG is not. Furthermore, the recent overall allowance in the RET tax rate for LFO indeed 
compensates for the difference in treatment by the MOE, but also reduces the linkage effect. 
Apart from the modest incentives for substitution between the two energy products, we can 
also observe that the upgrading effect tends to dominate the multiplier effect as far as costly 
improvements in product quality are concerned. This effect, however, is not yet fully 
exploited from the climate change perspective, as the linkage share is well below 50% and 
does not even reflect these environmental impacts properly.  
Table 4 characterizes the current overall energy tax structure in the Netherlands using 
the tax ratios introduced above. [INSERT TABLE 4] First, there is great variation in the total 
tax burden T across energy products. In particular, mineral oils used as motor fuels face a 
very high tax burden, e.g. 78% in the case of regular gasoline, whereas the (marginal) burden 
for a large industrial consumer of NG or electricity is only 20% or 16% respectively. Second, 
the role of specific excises more or less correlates with this overall picture. Interestingly, this 
share is lower for energy products consumed by firms. The only exception is coal, where the 
FT is the dominant factor in raising its tax-inclusive price relative to its substitutes. This 
excise alone raises the net retail price of coal by 26%, while this effect is only 17% for heavy 
fuel oil and not even 5% for large consumers of NG. Thus the much higher specific excise 
burden on coal strongly compensates for its lower net retail price.  
One important reason for these differences is the use of product characteristics in 
defining the tax base of both the FT and the RET. The tax structure reveals remarkable 
differences in its linkage share L. The recognition of carbon characteristics in defining the 
overall excise burden for energy products used for heating purposes is significant, at generally 
50%. Linkage is particularly limited for oil-based fuels, while 61% of the specific tax burden 
of coal is directly linked to carbon.   16
Summarizing, the particular energy tax structure in the Netherlands reflects a modest, 
though certainly not insignificant, effect of the introduction of green tax reform. In particular, 
the introduction of the RET has broadened the energy tax base being mainly responsible for 
higher rates on small-scale NG consumption and the taxation of electricity. Furthermore, 
despite its low tax rates, the effect of the FT should not be underestimated, given its wide 
applicability, in particular to (very) large consumers of coal and NG. As a result, the tax 
burden on (downstream) consumption of fossil fuels for heating purposes, such as mineral 
oils, small-scale NG consumption and electricity, is now significant in the Netherlands. 
 
4. TRADING OFF REGULATORY AND REVENUE-RAISING 
OBJECTIVES 
This section explains the relevance of recent developments in the theory of optimal corrective 
taxation for the assessment of the Dutch energy tax structure. First, I discuss how constraints 
on the set of instruments change the optimal corrective tax rules. Next, the consequences of 
these adaptations for energy taxation in particular are explained. 
 
Optimal tax rules 
Economists usually consider taxes as appropriate instruments for regulating environmental 
problems. Environmental economists especially stress their admirable role as a cost-efficient 
incentive mechanism to internalize environmental externalities. This view reflects the 
traditional Pigovian approach, which follows a rather narrow regulatory perspective on the 
role of environmental taxation (Baumol and Oates, 1988). According to this view, a uniform 
tax on effluents that reflects marginal damage of externalities in the optimum would be 
sufficient to reproduce the first best. So a tax on carbon emissions equal to the associated  17
marginal damage in the social optimum would guarantee a welfare improvement due to the 
environmental dividend gained by the internalization or regulation of the externality.  
The optimality of this classic Pigovian tax follows from (at least) two essential 
conditions:
9 (i) the government has no revenue-raising objective; and (ii) the set of available 
instruments for regulation is unconstrained. The first condition has been challenged in the 
literature on (potential) double dividends of green tax reforms in the 1990s. The (traditional) 
benchmark here is the optimal targeting principle reflecting both the Pigovian and optimal tax 
considerations (Sandmo, 1975). That is, if taxes face the dual task of correcting for 
externalities and generating revenues to finance public spending, the optimal tax rules 
typically suggest correcting externalities through externality taxes and using ‘other’ tax 
instruments for other public policy objectives.  
For instance, in a typical second-best model with polluting consumption and a 
distortionary labor tax, both the optimal tax rate on consumption and the optimal labor tax 
reflect the Ramsey rule for raising revenues with the lowest costs to private incomes. At the 
same time, the tax on dirty consumption also faces a Pigovian component that corrects for the 
environmental externality (Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002). Thus the typical second-best 
aspect is the correction of this Pigovian component for the marginal cost of public funds 
(MCPF) – that is, the ratio of the shadow cost of raising government revenue to the shadow 
value of an incremental increase in private income. That environmental tax reforms, i.e. 
switching from (distorting) labor taxes to (distortion-reducing) energy taxes, do not 
necessarily reap a double dividend typically follows from this modification. If the MCPF is 
high, i.e. raising public revenues is already expensive, then the (social) benefits from 
pollution abatement should be relatively higher to justify a given environmental tax. Only if 
the tax reform moves the tax system closer to its non-environmental optimum would an 
                                                 
9 Another condition is that a uniform tax on effluents is optimal only if (consumption) externalities depend on 
aggregate demand (Diamond, 1973, p. 527).  18
improvement of both the labor market and environmental quality be possible (Bovenberg, 
1999). 
The policy implication for the optimal tax structure of the targeting principle is that tax 
rates on the externality-generating commodity should reflect a balance between both tax 
principles. The presence of an externality only alters the tax formula for the externality-
generating commodity, and this is independent of, for instance, energy being an intermediate 
input or a final consumption good (Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002).
10 Even with the targeting 
principle, trade-offs between regulation and revenue-raising goals are inevitable for a given 
tax structure. If, in the status quo, the MCPF is large, the regulatory tax should be (relatively) 
low. Thus, if elastic goods are taxed at (relatively) high rates, a large additional regulatory tax 
on these goods would further exacerbate the tax distortion because the MCPF is large. Not 
only will it be optimal to have a lower environmental tax, but the government might improve 
overall welfare by finding other, less distorting ways to ‘internalize’ the externality. 
The benchmark for this traditional second-best view is a government that has access to 
efficient taxes to internalize externalities. In other words, the previously mentioned second 
condition of an unconstrained set of instruments holds. This condition, however, has been 
challenged in a set of recent papers that apply second-best analysis to the choice of the type of 
tax (Fullerton, Hong and Metcalfe, 2001; Smulders and Vollebergh, 2001; Cremer and 
Gahvari, 2003). If, for some reason, it is very costly to implement an agent-specific emission 
tax, other taxes, such as uniform taxes or taxes on inputs or outputs, might provide efficient 
alternatives. In such a second-best environment, the choice of the optimal regulatory tax base 
is an essential ingredient of the policy of the government.  
In a series of papers, Cremer et al. (1998, 2001 and 2003) have finally shown that the 
targeting principle might fail in economies characterized by emissions that are not publicly 
                                                 
10 Note, however, that the Ramsey component is still equal to zero for the intermediate good.  19
observable. In a model that analyzes the choice between emission and output taxes in an 
economy with imperfect observability of emissions, Cremer et al. (2003) show that the 
production efficiency rule is violated. The reason is that in their model, the effect of a 
marginal increase in emissions on the unit production cost varies across industries (due to 
differences in concealment costs). This has the important implication that (emission) tax rates 
have to differ across industries. As a consequence, output taxes have a Pigovian role to play in 
their model, because the concealment problem prevents the emission taxes being set equal to 
the full marginal social damage of emissions.  
Comparable findings are reported by Smulders and Vollebergh (2001) in a setting with 
sector-specific abatement but without a revenue-raising goal of the government. In their 
model, second-best considerations arise due to the assumption of administrative costs 
associated with different types of taxes, such as emission or input taxes. In choosing between 
environmental taxes, the targeting principle asks for taxes that are closely ‘targeted’ to the 
problem at stake. That is, the better targeted the instrument is to emissions, the smaller is the 
opportunity cost of losing incentives. Indirect taxes also regulate the emission intensity of an 
economy, but potentially at a cost of not exploiting all substitution mechanisms available for 
emission reduction.
11 If sectors differ in terms of their gross abatement potential, the optimal 
tax rule should balance this potential with sector-specific administrative costs for each type of 
tax. In this model, (sector-specific) input taxes have a Pigovian role if administrative cost are 
high (across sectors) relative to the gross abatement potential (of this sector).  
 
                                                 
11 Note that, in general, four substitution channels can be exploited by a tax system that aims to internalize 
externalities. First, output substitution accounts for the substitution between dirty and clean products. Second, 
input substitution is the replacement of dirty by clean inputs, such as labor. Third, linkage substitution replaces 
emission-intensive inputs for emission-extensive energy inputs, such as high-sulfur for low-sulfur coal. Fourth, 
abatement might separate emissions from input use.  20
Energy taxation 
What are the implications of these optimal tax rules for the taxation of energy products, i.e. 
choice of tax base and rate structure, given the climate change issue? Indeed, by taxing energy 
use energy consumption will be reduced, and thus the (set of) associated emissions. Smulders 
and Vollebergh (2001) explore in detail the conditions for specific energy taxes to be efficient 
substitutes for emission taxes. With close linkage between energy use and emissions, and if 
abatement of emissions (as an alternative means to reduce the pollution intensity of production 
besides changing the input mix) is relatively costly, taxes on polluting inputs such as energy may 
supplement emission taxes that fall short of marginal damage to internalize pollution 
externalities more fully. If linkage is close and abatement expensive, and if administrative costs 
associated with energy taxation are also sufficiently low relative to administrative costs 
associated with emission taxation, taxes on energy inputs should even fully replace emission 
taxes.  
This ‘modified’ Pigovian rule implies, for the climate change tax base, that all 
polluting inputs could be taxed according to their environmental goods characteristic 
responsible for the regulated emission (‘linkage’) unless sufficient options for abatement 
exist. Thus, instead of taxing carbon emissions from combustion, additional tax may be levied 
on heating fuel inputs, on the assumption that environmental damage is proportional to the 
amount of input used. Also, a broad tax on fossil-fuel-based energy products is efficient if a 
potential gain in savings on administrative costs outweighs the cost of not exploiting direct 
abatement opportunities.  
Two further complications arise, however. First, energy is not a homogeneous product 
and is typically produced as an intermediate input for firms and households upstream within 
the energy production sector. Second, energy use differs fundamentally across production 
sectors. In some sectors energy use is restricted to input use in a typical combustion  21
technology, but in other sectors it is part of a very different joint production technology, like 
in steel making and oil refining. Optimal regulatory tax policy rules should therefore 
acknowledge heterogeneity in (emission) technology across sectors. Indeed, sector-specific 
exemptions or non-linear taxes may be justified if input-emission linkage fails or (additional) 
administrative costs are prohibitive for sectors.
12 The consequences of such heterogeneity for 
the choice of the energy tax base and rate are explored in detail in the next paragraphs. 
First of all, it is typically assumed that an energy-based carbon tax should apply to 
fossil-fuel energy composite – that is, to all fossil-fuel energy products. Any consumption of 
these fuels causes emissions, and therefore each energy product should be taxed where it is 
actually burned. However, this presumption is rather strong. An important choice exists 
between what Pearson and Smith (1992) have called a ‘primary’ carbon tax and a ‘final’ 
carbon tax. A ‘primary’ carbon tax would be one that was levied early in the chain of production 
and processing, or ‘upstream’, i.e. on raw energy sources at the point where they are mined or 
extracted (coal mines, oil wells, etc.). A ‘final’ carbon tax, on the other hand, would not be levied 
until much later in the chain of energy production and processing, or ‘downstream’, i.e. at the 
point where energy sources had been converted into final fuel products sold to business and 
domestic energy consumers. Thus the main difference between the two approaches concerns 
production processes in which primary (‘raw’) energy is processed into energy products suitable 
for use at later stages of the production and consumption chain.
13 
Obviously, the primary carbon tax establishes the best linkage to (potential) emissions, 
because it implicitly accounts for emissions in the production stage of the final fuel products by 
taxing the carbon content of the raw materials. The linkage with carbon emissions in the energy 
production and consumption chain is much weaker if the tax is based on the carbon content of 
                                                 
12 For instance, if a particular tax already exists in the status quo, environmental tax reform could take advantage 
of the sunk administrative cost associated with this tax.  
13 See Pearson and Smith (1992) for a discussion of the pros and cons of both types of carbon taxes. 
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the final fuel products. If an assessment of the whole chain of fuel production and processing 
from the primary stage until the point at which the tax is levied can be made, an appropriate 
linkage could be established. This, however, calls for an estimate of the level of such emissions 
to be included in the amount of tax that should be paid on each final fuel product. Such an 
estimate would need to be based on assumptions about the processing of fuels, and these will 
inevitably be imprecise. Since they will have to be based on average practice, no incentive for 
greater carbon efficiency during processing is provided. 
Another example of the type of problems that may arise is that electricity consumption 
may run the risk of ‘double taxation’, i.e. a tax on both (fossil-fuel) inputs and output. 
Although electricity as such is not polluting, a downstream tax on electricity consumption has 
the advantage of discouraging this relatively inefficient use of fossil-fuel energy. Conversion 
losses in the electricity sector are, on average, much higher than in the direct use of these 
fuels. Furthermore, if the tax were levied on the distributors of electricity, the government 
could combine it with incentives to stimulate these substitutes, including CHP facilities. 
Without a tax on upstream fossil-fuel inputs in electricity production, however, the upstream 
emissions are only implicitly taxed if the fossil-fuel inputs are not exempted from a broad-
based energy tax. Thus a trade-off exists between more efficient use of energy in particular 
applications, such as the generation of heat, and the comprehensiveness of the (indirect) input 
tax base. 
A second issue is that energy use in some complex joint production processes, such as 
steel making, oil refining and other related chemical processes, deserves special treatment.
14 
For instance, steel-making companies that use coke-oven gas (a by-product of coke 
manufacturing) as a fuel in their coke ovens, boilers and reheat furnaces in fact recycle or 
‘abate’ carbon emissions (Ayres and Ayres, 1998). The same holds for other by-products in 
                                                 
14 Also Poterba and Rotemberg (1995) acknowledge the importance of joint production of energy sectors. They 
focus, however, on the implication of unilateral carbon taxes for border tax adjustments.  23
steel making and oil refining, such as blast-furnace gas, coal gas, petrocokes and other liquid 
and gaseous residuals. Energy inputs and carbon emissions could easily become substitutes if 
these gases were taxed, and environmental externalities would be exacerbated instead of 
reduced. In other words, the use of these residuals should be optimally exempted from a 
regulatory energy tax. 
15 
Other issues of heterogeneity relate to specific carbon abatement opportunities that are 
not distributed randomly across agents. Usually, carbon abatement options are taken into 
account which are entirely separable from existing production processes, such as ‘offsetting’ 
techniques like carbon sequestration. Recently attention has grown for another set of 
opportunities, such as large-scale storage using monoethanol and decarbonisation in 
integrated power plants or in other gasification processes (Anderson and Newell, 2003). 
These options, however, are mainly related to large existing fossil fuel based production 
processes, in particular to electricity production and the joint production processes of oil 
refining and steel making.  
An energy tax design based on fossil fuel input use would not provide any incentives 
for such abatement options. Therefore, in order to provide proper incentives from a regulatory 
perspective the tax should allow for agent-specific tax rebates. Accordingly, one mimics a 
‘net’ carbon emission tax base by allowing agents to subtract taxes due from their overall 
energy tax bill. This also accounts for a natural limit to this subsidization because the rebates 
would never exceed the original amount of tax due.  
A final consideration in (optimal) energy tax design is how to avoid unintended 
distortions on other margins of choice. As Keen (1998, p.20) has shown, regulatory energy 
taxes should be related to the underlying externality-causing goods characteristic (Keen, 
1998, p. 20). Thus a specific tax on the carbon content of a fuel is the best-targeted indirect 
                                                 
15 Note that taxation for revenue raising purposes is not effective in these cases as the energy tax could easily 
evaded by burning off residual gases.  24
instrument in the case of climate change, whereas an ad valorem tax would also penalize 
characteristics that are not responsible for climate change, such as the heating potential of 
energy products. But specific taxes also have important caveats. For instance, climate change 
is not the only environmental externality that an energy tax should address.
  Other 
environmental problems, such as acid rain and smog, are well known. The heterogeneity of 
production processes in terms of their emission profile across different environmental 
dimensions can be considerable. If specific taxes tend to stimulate different adaptations in 
production   processes,  they   might  even  generate  important  trade-offs.  Whether 
carbon, energy content or any other characteristic provides the best incentives is an issue of 
optimal targeting in itself.
16 In this paper, I simply assume that carbon is such an appropriate 
indicator, given other policy efforts to internalize other environmental externalities. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, first of all, uniform corrective taxation is not always the best solution to ‘repair’ 
an externality. Specific sectors might be optimally exempted from indirect environmental 
taxes. Emissions and inputs can be substitutes in some sectors, and administrative cost might 
be prohibitive (relative to the abatement potential). Second, the complicated interplay between 
regulatory and revenue-raising objectives can no longer be solved by the targeting principle in 
all circumstances. Although the fundamental idea that more direct instruments are beneficial 
to society still remains valid, these benefits should be weighed against efficiency losses due to 
other second-best elements, such as heterogeneity in administrative or abatement costs. Third, 
higher tax revenues from an environmental tax base need not signal optimal tax reform. 
Higher tax revenues on some energy inputs, or equivalently, lack of appropriate abatement 
                                                 
16 Note that the solution here is not a simple aggregation across externalities by translating them into one 
common measure (money value) and then adding the (marginal) values in order to find the optimal tax level. The 
problem is that emissions can become substitutes if taxes are well targeted in different environmental policy 
dimensions, which is related to the choice of the tax base.  25
incentives, may even exacerbate emissions, whereas alternative tax bases (e.g. consumption) 
may raise revenue at lower (distortionary) cost. 
 
5. DUTCH ENERGY TAX POLICY LESSONS 
What can we learn from the energy tax structure developments in the Netherlands? At face 
value, regulatory considerations seem to be dominant. Whereas the FT (and the MOE) has been 
designed for revenue-raising reasons, the newly introduced RET raises much more tax revenue 
but also claims to focus on the regulation of fossil-fuel energy use and its associated (climate 
change) emissions. As a reference for the subsequent discussion of the choice of the overall tax 
base and rates of the energy composite as well as potential improvements, Table 5 summarizes 
the main characteristics of the FT and the RET. [INSERT TABLE 5]  
 
Choice of energy composite tax base 
A first observation is that the FT, not the RET, is mainly responsible for the remarkable 
comprehensiveness of the Dutch energy excise structure from a climate change perspective (see 
also Table 2). The FT taxes coal and NG upstream (if used as fuel or if distributed to others for 
domestic use) and oil through a tax on refined oil products. In contrast, the RET mainly focuses 
on the downstream consumption of the major energy products consumed at the household and 
small-firm level in the Netherlands, i.e. NG and electricity. Only the direct taxation of electricity 
has been added to the energy tax base, while NG is now also taxed at the household level. 
The choice of these energy tax bases reveals intriguing paradoxes. First of all, the 
upstream taxation of energy products is considered particularly distortive from the revenue 
perspective, whereas the downstream taxation of energy products implicitly exempts upstream 
emissions. Thus the choice of tax base is precisely opposite to the main purpose of both taxes. 
One wonders why a specific excise, like the FT, has been introduced for revenue reasons  26
because energy consumption is already taxed through the VAT. The explanation for this 
‘anomaly’ is that the FT replaces a system of small environmental charges. Therefore its tax 
base had to be linked to ‘the environment’ (even though its revenue no longer has to be used for 
environmental expenditures). The RET has always been regarded as a unilateral environmental 
tax, which should exempt exposed energy consumption, i.e. upstream energy use by energy-
intensive industries and electricity producers.  
Second, the choice to tax climate change emissions indirectly through energy (input) use 
is particularly viable if such indirect taxes already exist in the status quo and the welfare loss 
due to less emission-specific incentives is small. Indeed, carbon emissions are closely linked to 
energy use and the FT provided an excellent opportunity to reduce additional administrative 
costs for a targeted regulatory input tax. This tax applied to most energy products, except 
electricity and crude oil, and all (upstream) consumers, although lower rates apply to large 
energy-intensive firms (see below). Adding a small CO2 excise component to the original excise 
rates based on energy content in 1990 made perfect sense, just like the reform into a hybrid 
energy tax based on CO2 and energy content in 1992. After the failure of the European hybrid 
tax on energy, further increases in the tax rates of the FT would have been logical, given the 
relatively cheap options for carbon abatement in the energy-intensive industries. This option has 
not been pursued, though, due to fear of tax-based relocation of the (large) energy-intensive 
industries in the Netherlands. The choice of the Dutch government to introduce another tax, the 
RET, primarily aimed at the sheltered sectors with their rather inelastic consumption of NG and 
electricity, however, makes more sense from a revenue-raising perspective. It is rather unlikely 
that the much higher cost of carbon abatement by the non-exposed sector, together with the 
higher administrative cost, outweighed the cost of a rise in the tax rate of the FT.
17 
                                                 
17 Therefore the only administrative economies of scale are the concurrence of the excises taxed under the FT 
with the oil tax base of the MOE, and in the taxes due from households because the excise on electricity and NG 
under the RET are due from the energy distribution firms. Additional administrative costs for small-scale 
consumption of NG and electricity, however, were also rather limited because the network for delivery is almost  27
Another set of paradoxes is apparent from the current energy excise structure, which is 
mainly of the ‘final’ carbon tax type (see section 4). Only the FT on coal and NG applies to 
upstream fuel use, but CO2 emissions associated with the production of several energy products 
of the final type are exempted either implicitly, as in the case of crude oil, or explicitly, as in the 
case of electricity production.  
Note, first of all, that none of the excises (including the MOE) taxes fuels that are used 
in refinery processes. In the case of mineral oils, the FT is (like the MOE) a typical ‘output’ tax, 
leaving the main fossil-fuel input, crude oil, untaxed. Consequently, carbon emissions in the 
refinery are exempt. Attempts by the Dutch tax authority to bring own consumption of the 
residuals of refinery processes, such as refinery gases and petrocokes, under the jurisdiction of 
the FT failed. The decision settled by the Dutch Supreme Court in 1999 was based on the 
presumption that other excises on mineral oils could not be applied outside the realm of the 
MOE. European harmonization of excises on mineral oils would not leave room for other 
(revenue-raising) excises to be applied to refineries.
18 Paradoxically, this decision improves the 
(implicit) regulatory incentives of the FT, as the taxation of residuals clearly favors substitution 
towards untaxed elements in the refinery process, or even towards flaring. The taxation of fuels 
for revenue-raising purposes would clearly result in more, instead of less, CO2 emission. This 
exemption on fuel use clearly benefits the environment. Note, however, that a carbon tax of the 
‘primary’ type would avoid such problems altogether.
19 
A similar observation holds for the taxation of other residual gases from energy-
intensive industries, such as steel making. Own consumption of residual gases, such as blast-
furnace and coke-oven gases, is currently exempted from the FT, but delivery to other firms is 
subject to tax (see Table 2). The current exemption is rational from a regulatory perspective 
                                                                                                                                                          
entirely controlled by energy distribution firms in the Netherlands, and they already exploit economies of scale 
in the control and monitoring of household energy consumption. 
18 This decision basically follows a decision of the European Court on the applicability of Directive 92/81 on 
other excises on mineral oils.  28
because reuse of residuals always reduces CO2  emissions. Therefore it should be made 
permanent. The same holds for delivery to other parties. The current taxation of the carbon-
based input, i.e. coal, already accounts for the (implicit) taxation of carbon emissions, including 
those associated with the use of residual gases. Bringing these gases under the FT implies 
double taxation of the carbon contained in this input.  
The recent tax reform with respect to electricity is another example of the paradox that 
the revenue-raising FT serves regulatory incentives better than its explicit regulatory alternative. 
Electricity is only taxed directly under the ‘output-based’ RET regime, which exempts carbon 
emissions during electricity production. Until recently the FT also applied to the main inputs for 
electricity production in the Netherlands, NG and coal. Since 2001, the energy products used for 
electricity production, including CHP installations, have been exempted from the FT in favor of 
higher rates of the output-based RET. Accordingly, input substitution by electricity producers to 
reduce CO2 emissions is now no longer directly addressed by the energy excise structure.  
The main reason behind this remarkable tax shift is a compensation for CO2 abatement 
measures as promised by electricity producers according to the so-called ‘coal covenant’. 
Moreover, the measure sustains the promotion of (NG-based) CHP generation in the 
Netherlands. After the termination of a generous subsidy to any (potential) producer of CHP 
several years ago, the booming CHP business came to a sudden standstill and even existing 
installations were threatened.
20 Broadening the NG tax base to include firms of medium size 
under the RET would impose a further disincentive to CHP. Shifting the tax burden from the FT 
to a tax on ‘output’, i.e. the RET on electricity, would lower the tax burden on the generation of 
electricity. Because the different modes of power generation are treated similarly under this 
                                                                                                                                                          
19 Use of crude oil as a feedstock in the chemical sector could easily be exempted. 
20 CHP was subsidized in the Netherlands through a fixed price per kWh delivered to the national grid. This 
price was considerably above the market price for electricity and therefore stimulated a fast expansion of CHP in 
the Netherlands. Note that CHP is still subsidized by a reduction of the RET on electricity produced from these 
plants (not larger than 200GWh).  29
reform, large-scale power plants no longer face input and abatement incentives to reduce 
climate change emissions.  
Consistent with the purpose of the tax is the lack of incentives for carbon abatement in 
the FT. Apart from stimulating CHP generation, the FT has no provisions for ‘carbon’ rebates. 
Although carbon abatement investments by large energy-intensive firms subject to the FT are 
profitable even at (very) low rates, they are at odds with the revenue-raising purpose of the tax. 
And even proposals to favor carbon sequestration through afforestation by providing offsets in 
the RET have never been put into practice. Firms distributing NG and electricity would have got 
tax rebates for certified afforestation (under the Carbon Offset Verification System), but not for 
other carbon abatement investments.  
Interestingly, the RET and its associated policy package include typical elements of a 
two-part instrument for subsidizing energy-efficient technologies and non-fossil-fuel-based 
energy production (Fullerton and Wolverton, 1997). First of all, electricity produced from 
renewable resources (green electricity and gas) was originally exempted (zero rate), and it has 
had a lower rate since 2003. Second, the energy distribution firms might qualify for tax rebates 
(at given prices) for CHP plants, for the production of electricity from renewable resources and 
even for subsidies on energy-saving technologies. Also, sustainable production of heat in 100% 
biomass installations (electricity, heat or both) is stimulated through this subsidy.  
Summarizing, taken together the Dutch energy taxes provide comprehensive taxation of 
energy products. All upstream and downstream fossil-fuel products, except crude oil, are subject 
to tax. Furthermore, the exclusion of own consumption of residual gases is a clear case of 
optimal non-uniform corrective energy taxation. The extension of this exemption to residual 
gases delivered to others should even be considered. Finally, the so-called regulatory energy tax 
shows that green tax reform does not always generate optimal regulatory taxes. Its design 
clearly reflects several unexploited regulatory incentives that can only be explained by the  30
necessity to guarantee stable revenues. Therefore, one might wonder whether this tax on energy 
consumption is not a relatively distorting way to raise revenue. 
 
Choice of energy composite tax rates 
As far as tax rates are concerned, both taxes are specific with a hybrid structure, while FT rates 
are much lower than RET rates (see Table 5). With its upstream orientation, the FT also taxes 
energy-intensive consumers but only at low rates, while the RET taxes the consumption by 
small firms and households of NG and electricity, the main energy products consumed by these 
agents, at high rates. Even though all agents are due to pay RET over their inframarginal 
consumption of energy, energy-intensive industries face no tax at all at the margin.  
Again, tax rates on the different energy products also hardly follow the logic as implied 
by the purpose of both taxes. The much lower tax burden for energy products consumed by 
industry (see ratio T in Table 4) reflects the Ramsey perspective. In general, (energy-intensive) 
industry is more sensitive to the energy tax base, and distortions are more likely for intermediate 
inputs, such as heavy fuel oil (HFO), coal and (large-scale consumption of) gas and electricity. 
Moreover, the VAT is the most important element of the total tax burden for these products and 
therefore has less of an (upstream) impact because it is shifted downstream to consumers. Thus 
to tax energy substitutes for households and small firms at a much higher level through the RET 
primarily makes sense from a revenue perspective.  
Furthermore, the two specific taxes raise the overall tax burden in remarkably different 
ways (see column S). Apart from the VAT, the (normalized) tax burden for the energy 
substitutes for (energy-intensive) industries is dominated by the FT, and for households and 
small firms by the RET. As a result, the Pigovian element is exactly opposite to what one would 
expect. The FT clearly favors NG over oil and coal for the relevant substitutes at the industry 
level. Coal faces a total tax burden almost twice as high as the tax burden on NG which closely  31
follows the Pigovian logic of indirect taxation according to the (relative) pollution intensity of 
these products. In contrast, the relative (normalized) total tax burden of heating products for 
households and small firms, such as NG, LFO and electricity, is similar. Clearly, this burden, 
which is mainly caused by the RET, appears not to follow the Pigovian logic.  
However, closer inspection of the overall upgrading effect of both specific taxes, and of 
carbon linkage in particular, (see also share L in Table 4) reveals that both taxes still stimulate 
upgrading towards less carbon-intensive fuels. To evaluate these upgrading incentives in the 
current tax structure in more detail, Table 6 compares this structure with the externalities related 
to the energy products, in particular CO2 emissions. [INSERT TABLE 6] Emission factors for 
CO2 reflect the linkage between product characteristics of fuels and particular emissions 
associated with their consumption. They are particularly useful for externalities that are not 
process-specific or that vary with time and space, such as CO2 emissions. Moreover, the shadow 
price for each emission is similar, irrespective of its source. In this case, the shadow price only 
affects the tax level, not the (energy) tax structure.  
The first column of Table 6 shows relative CO2 emissions per GJ, excluding upstream 
emissions. The picture is well known: gas is relatively clean, followed by the different oil-based 
products, and coal is the most polluting product in terms of (potential) CO2 emissions. The 
lower ‘direct’ CO2 impact of electricity from the national grid is somewhat misleading because 
conversion and transport losses are not included. Comparing these emission factors with 
(normalized) ratios of FT and RET (column 2) suggests that the excise structure does not reflect 
these emission factors at all. Even though linkage is around 50% for most energy products used 
for heating purposes, coal appears to be subject to much lower excise rates than NG and oil-
based products. However, appearances are again somewhat deceptive here. With the MOE 
included, the relative tax burden is more similar to the carbon emission factors (see column 3). 
Moreover, the differences are less dramatic for particular energy substitutes. For instance, the  32
FT (and RET) on HFO, coal and NG consumption for large consumers reflects the underlying 
carbon characteristics rather well. The same holds for energy substitutes at the household level, 
such as LFO, NG and electricity.
21  
Our findings sketch a much more refined picture than the view that exemptions and 
reliefs would usually run counter to the economic logic of using environmental taxes (Ekins and 
Speck, 1999). Note, first of all, that these sometimes loosely called ‘exemptions’ for large 
energy-intensive industries only apply to the decreasing rates for NG and electricity and the 
(implicit) exemptions of coal and HFO from the RET tax base in the Netherlands. Apart from 
the tax base exemptions for residual energy products under the FT, only electricity consumption 
over 10 million kWh is not subject to taxation. Second, exemptions for energy-intensive sectors 
can be observed in other countries applying carbon or energy taxes as well, and they were even 
a cornerstone of the older proposal for a hybrid EU carbon tax to prevent carbon leakage from 
(large) energy-intensive industries.
22 Unilateral action of a small open economy might decrease 
local welfare, not even necessarily at the gain of a global reduction in climate change emissions 
(Hoel, 1992). Third, one has to evaluate the entire energy tax burden across energy products to 
account for important differences in elasticities within the overall energy composite, rather than 
to look at only one tax at a time. Moreover, even with low tax rates, careful design of specific 
excises may still provide useful incentives for upgrading. 
To conclude, the non-uniform overall tax rates on the fossil-fuel energy composite in the 
Netherlands seem to reflect the Sandmo (1975) rule, although coincidentally. The tax rate 
structure combines a more or less upstream indirect corrective tax at low rates by the FT with 
the generation of relatively non-distortive downstream tax revenue at high rates by the RET. 
                                                 
21 The use of coal for heating purposes at the household level is strongly restricted by other (environmental and 
health) regulations. 
22 Also, the difference between unleaded gasoline and diesel is a result of tax policy competition on the 
(international) transport market.   33
More detailed analysis of the unit of taxation of both specific excises, however, shows that both 
taxes feature similar Pigovian elements as far as the upgrading or linkage effect is concerned.  
 
Energy tax reform 
A final, though interesting, issue is whether (Pareto-improving) tax reforms might be available. 
If we focus on corrective tax base aspects, the combination of inframarginal exemptions, tax 
rebates and income tax compensation leaves considerable room for improving the regulatory 
incentives of the energy taxes in general (Vollebergh, Koutstaal and de Vries, 1997; Bovenberg 
and Goulder, 2001).
23 In the Dutch case, some of these options are already exploited, but some 
remain. One option, for instance, is to change the FT into an ‘upstream’ tax across the board 
while allowing for carbon tax rebates and exemptions for (downstream) feedstocks, CHP or 
even carbon capture and storage. This implies the (implicit) inclusion of emissions by refineries 
in the tax base and a reintroduction of an electricity input tax. Consequently, tax rates would be 
lower for a given amount of emission reduction because the elastic demand for energy of large 
energy intensive industries is exploited.  
The main objection against raising the tax burden on energy-intensive industries is, as 
mentioned before, its unilateral nature. Whether tax rate differences between exposed and non-
exposed agents make sense very much depends on the issue of whether the current structure is 
optimal. Moreover, evidence on the relocation of industries due to environmental regulation is 
scarce and the literature is hardly conclusive on its significance (Jaffe et al., 1995; Smarzynska 
and Wei, 2001). One important (recent) finding is that governments tend to find other ways to 
compensate industries for increasing the (environmental) regulatory burden (Eliste and 
Fredriksson, 2002). Burden distribution and compensation through corporation and income 
taxes have also dominated the policy debate on the introduction and adaptations of both the FT 
                                                 
23 Interestingly, the RET used to apply such inframarginal exemptions, but only for households. This exemption 
for 800m
3 and 800kWh has been changed recently into a tax credit with similar value (Euro 142).   34
and, in particular, the RET in the Netherlands. However, energy-intensive industries now also 
pay tax on their NG and electricity consumption, but only on its inelastic part.  
Apart from the energy tax structure across agents, the design of the tax rate itself is also 
important. The use of specific excises instead of ad valorem rates certainly makes sense from 
the regulatory perspective. Accordingly, the energy tax induces quality improvements. Firms 
and households are more likely to produce or choose fuels of higher quality, in particular if the 
tax rate structure is linked to characteristics that are also the focus of the regulator. However, the 
current design is not transparent and the implied linkage leaves room for improvements.  
Both the FT and the RET are now defined in relation to a standardized hybrid tax base in 
terms of GJ and carbon. That is, the administrator selects a particular set of energy product 
characteristics and normalizes the tax rates relative to both characteristics of one fuel. Next, the 
taxes due on the different products are recalculated into a tax per volume. A nice feature of the 
current FT on coal is, as explained in section 2, that agents can vary their taxes due by selecting 
different qualities of coal. Firms may choose a selective excise per GJ and per carbon instead of 
per volume. The advantage of this system is that it implicitly penalizes grades of ‘ore’, in this 
case coal, of low quality in terms of energy content or energy content per unit of carbon if the 
goods characteristics are based on ‘average’ performance. For instance, if a firm uses grades of 
lower quality, it has to pay more tax for a given amount of energy performance of fuels.  
However, these incentives for upgrading, i.e. reducing CO2 emissions per GJ, are not 
fully exploited now. To provide further and more transparent incentives for quality 
improvements, the system for coal could be applied more generally, i.e. to NG, oil, oil products 
and even electricity. This would encourage firms to select those fuels as well as variants of these 
fuels with the lowest tax per GJ and per carbon. Environmental goods characteristics, including 
grade and quality of the ‘ore’ (coal, NG and crude oil), are usually well known and well 
documented. The same holds for derived fuels (gasoline, LFO and HFO) and the use of the fuels  35
as feedstock in steel-making processes and chemical processes – that is, emission factors are 
public information for all fuels. Accordingly, the excise rate would become more closely linked 
to the actual underlying emission factors. Administration costs for the government are limited 
because the burden of proof for using different qualities of coal falls on the firm. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Broadly speaking, the two Dutch energy taxes taken together nicely fit general findings from 
economic theory. These findings suggest taxing carbon emissions through an upstream input tax 
in order to regulate these emissions at lowest cost, and taxing downstream energy products in 
order to minimize distortions from (indirect) taxation. Remarkably, the general purposes of both 
taxes are precisely at odds with these findings. In general, the FT, with its broad, mainly 
upstream tax base, serves regulatory objectives best, whereas the RET, with its small, 
downstream tax base, makes sense from a revenue-raising perspective. Additional regulatory 
incentives remain rather limited, although the RET employs some emission-saving mechanisms, 
such as subsidies for CHP and the use of non-fossil-fuel inputs and electricity production.  
One important lesson is that improving regulatory incentives of existing (upstream) taxes 
is particularly efficient in the case of climate change. Introducing emission taxes is relatively 
expensive if existing (indirect) taxes provide an efficient substitute. With their strong linkage, 
the limited (cheap) options for direct emission abatement and their low transaction costs, 
upstream taxes based on the carbon content of fossil-fuel inputs are still preferable. Even low 
tax rates would trigger large energy-intensive firms to invest in carbon abatement options, in 
particular if the tax allowed for (self-enforcing) tax rebates.  
Another lesson is that tax exemptions might very well improve welfare, in particular if 
one restricts the analysis to the environmental dividend alone. Exempting (carbon-based) 
recycling gases (e.g. refinery gas, blast-furnace coal) from any energy tax base is useful in  36
restraining some producers from emitting more instead of less. However, other exemptions, 
such as energy inputs to power plants and refineries, are less reasonable. Higher ‘output’ tax 
rates on refined oil and electricity never compensate for the loss of abatement potential from 
these plants, in particular because they are usually large and energy-intensive. Other ways to 
improve the effectiveness of the existing taxes would be to allow for tax rebates for abatement 
and to relate the tax rates even more explicitly to product characteristics. 
Whether green tax reform is a viable policy strategy depends on the embedding of such 
reforms. In particular, for a tax to be a viable option for such a reform, one has to balance 
carefully the choice of a particular tax base and rate in relation to issues such as (local and 
global) environmental benefits, (emission) elasticity, availability of other indirect taxes, 
transaction costs and the international dimension. But even if the answer would be in favor of 
such a green tax reform, higher revenues from environmental tax bases, such as energy, do not 
always guarantee environmental improvements. Actually, they may even exacerbate pollution if 
not properly designed.   37
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Table 1   Tax revenue from excises on specific energy products in the Netherlands in 
1988, 1994 and 2002 (bn Euro) 
 
 1988  1994  2002
a) 
Type of tax:  







-  Fuel tax   0.1  0.3
  0.6 
-  Regulatory energy tax  0  0  2.4 
Total 2.3  4.3  8.8 
 







as a share of total tax receipts (%)  4.3  6.7  8.8 
as a share of GDP (%)  1.1  1.6  2.0 
 
a)  Estimate. 
 
Source: National Budget (Miljoenennota’s), several years. 
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Table 2   Total excise rates on specific energy products in the Netherlands in 2002  
(Euro) 
 








Mineral oils: motor fuels        
- leaded gasoline   Liter  685
a)  12   698 
- unleaded gasoline   Liter  615
a) 12    627 
- diesel/light fuel oil – low S
b)  Liter 332
a) 14    345 
- diesel/light fuel oil   Liter  346
a) 14    359 
- LPG  Kg  104  16    120 
 
      
Mineral oils: other use        
- diesel   Liter  53
a) 14 131  197 
- light fuel oil   Liter  53
a) 14 132  198 
- heavy fuel oil  Kg  16  16    32 
- LPG  Kg    16  156  172 
        
Coal        
- coal
c)  Kg   12  12 
- blast-furnace, coke-oven,  








- coal gasification gas  GJ    462    462 
        
Natural gas        
- gas (0–5,000)  m
3   11  124  135 
- gas (5,000–170,000)  m
3   11  58  69 
- gas (170,000–1mn)  m
3   11  11  21 
- gas (1mn–10mn)  m
3   11  11 
- gas (> 10mn)  m
3   7  7 
        
Electricity        
- electricity (0–10,000)  KWh      60  60 
- electricity (10,000–50,000)  KWh      20  20 
- electricity (50,000–10mn)  KWh      6  6 
- electricity (> 10mn)  KWh         
 
a)  Includes strategic storage tax of Euro 6 per unit. 
b)  Sulfur content below 50 ppm. 
c)  Taxpayer may opt for GJ and carbon content as a tax base, with a rate of Euro 0.198 per 
GJ or Euro 2.4493 per 1,000kg CO2. 
d)  If traded; the rate is zero if these gases are produced and used in the same plant. 
 








    Light fuel oil
c) Natural  gas
d) Difference 
1.   Gross retail price (pn+t), 
including taxes 
   
17.09 
   
13.95
 
   
3.14 
             
2a.   Specific excise (ts)            
  a. Volume (ts1)    1.48        1.48    
  b. GJ or C content (ts2)  4.02    4.27     −0.25    
  d. Total (ts1+ts2)   5.49    4.27    1.23  
             
2b.   Value added tax (ta)            
 Total  (ta(pn+ ts))   2.73    2.23    0.50  
             
2.  Total tax (t)     8.22    6.49    1.73 
             
3.   Net retail price (pn) 
excluding taxes 
   
8.87 
   
7.46 
   
1.41 
 
a)  Calculations are based on energy prices including excises but excluding VAT; the energy price 
for natural gas is based on the retail price of a small consumer (2,000m
3). 
b)  All prices and taxes are normalized per GJ based on data from Dutch Ministry of Finance. 
c)  Light fuel oil is subject to mineral oil excise, fuel tax and RET (see Table 2). 
d) Natural  gas  (800–5,000m
3) is subject to fuel tax and RET (see Table 2). 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands; Vermeend and van der Vaart, 1997. 
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Table 4   Tax ratios for specific energy products in the Netherlands in 2002 (%)
a)  
 
Energy product   T  S  L 
Mineral oils: motor fuels      
- leaded gasoline   78  80  1 
- unleaded gasoline   72  78  1 
- diesel/light fuel oil   62  74  2 
      
Mineral oils: other use      
- light fuel oil   48  67  39 
- heavy fuel oil  28  43  27 
      
Coal      
- coal
  32 53  61 
      
Natural gas      
- gas (0–5,000)  46  66  46 
- gas (5,000–170,000)  36  56  46 
- gas (170,000–1mn)  24  33  46 
- gas (1mn–10mn)  21  25  46 
- gas (> 10mn)  20  19  46 
      
Electricity      
- electricity (0–10,000)  47  66  n.a. 
- electricity (10,000–50,000)  32  49  n.a. 
- electricity (50,000–10mn)  21  25  n.a. 
- electricity (> 10mn)  16  0  n.a. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on energy prices from Statistics Netherlands and emission 
factors of fuels used by Dutch Ministry of Finance in 1997 (see Vermeend and van der Vaart, 
1997). 
 
a)   No energy prices are available for some products, like LPG and coal gasification gas.  45
Table 5  Comparison of fuel tax and regulatory energy tax  
 
  Fuel tax  Regulatory energy tax 
Main purpose  -  revenue raising  -  regulation (climate change 
emissions) 
Tax base  -  all energy products except 
electricity 
-  only small-scale consumption of 
natural gas and electricity 
Linkage -  upstream coal and natural gas 
-  downstream oil 
-  downstream  
Exemptions -  residual energy products 
-  fuels used for electricity 
production 
-  large energy-intensive industries 
-  horticulture 
Abatement incentives -  no -  carbon sequestration 
-  subsidies for non-fossil-fuel 
products 
Tax rate structure  -  specific (hybrid)   -  specific (hybrid)  
Level -  low -  high, but decreasing with higher 
levels of consumption 
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Table 6  Pollution coefficients compared with total nominal excise rates and gross 




  Standardized nominal 
 
 
  FT and RET
  Total excise
b)  Gross retail 
price
c) 
 CO2/GJ Euro/GJ Euro/GJ Euro/GJ 
Mineral oils: motor fuel      
- unleaded gasoline   100  10  350  191 
- diesel  101  9  182  121 
        
Mineral oils: other use      
- light fuel oil   100  100  100  100 
- heavy fuel oil  106  10  14  36 
- LPG  90  95  69  n.a. 
        
Coal      
- coal  129  11  8  14 
        
Natural gas      
- households (< 5,000m
3) 77  106  78  83 
- industry (> 10bn m
3) 77  6  4  33 
        
Electricity      
- households (< 10,000kWh)  52
d)  415 303 325 
- industry (50,000–10bn kWh)  52
d)  42 31 94 
 
a)  Pollution coefficients as well as taxes and prices are standardized relative to LFO 
b)  Including (if applied) mineral oil excise (MOE), fuel tax (FT), inventory tax and 
regulatory energy tax (RET), but excluding VAT. 
c)  Includes VAT. 
d)  Emission factor for electricity is based on carbon composition of fuel inputs of electricity 
sector in 1998. 
 
Source: Own calculations using emission factors used by Dutch Ministry of Finance in 1997 
(see Vermeend and van der Vaart, 1997). 
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